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Abstract
In April 2007, the Estonian Government moved a memorial commemo-
rating the Soviet liberation of the country from the Nazis to a less promi-
nent and visible location in Tallinn. This decision triggered rioting among 
Russian-speaking minorities and cyber terrorism targeting Estonia's criti-
cal economic and political infrastructure. Drawing upon the Estonian 
cyber attacks, this article argues that globalization and the Internet have 
enabled transnational groups—such as the Russian diaspora—to avenge 
their grievances by threatening the sovereignty of nation-states in cyber-
space. Sophisticated and virtually untraceable political "hacktivists" may 
now possess the ability to disrupt or destroy government operations, 
banking transactions, city power grids, and even military weapon sys-
tems. Fortunately, western countries banded together to effectively com-
bat the Estonian cyber attacks and minimize their effects. However, this 
article concludes that in the age of globalization, interdependence, and 
digital interconnectedness, nation-states must engage in increased coop-
erative cyber-defense activities to counter and prevent devastating Inter-
net attacks and their implications.
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Introduction
During the information age, the Internet has facilitated dramatic 
increases in worldwide interconnectivity and communication. This form 
of globalization has yielded benefits, such as improved standards of living 
in the developing world, but it has also given rise to new weapons of resis-
tance for groups seeking to oppose certain political measures and ideolo-
gies. One demonstration of the latter point came about through the cyber 
attacks on Estonia in April and May 2007 by digital activists from the 
Russian diaspora. This article examines these fundamentally political 
attacks in cyberspace within the overall context of globalization. It argues 
that the situation that unfolded in Estonia in the spring of 2007 illustrates 
the increasing ability of transnational networks to use digital tools to chal-
lenge the policies and sovereignty of nation-states worldwide. However, 
the multinational responses to the Estonian cyber terrorist attacks dem-
onstrate the growing interest of states in defending national sovereignty 
in the realm of cyberspace.
Ethnic Tensions in Estonia
Estonia and Russia have a long history of strife in their bilateral relation-
ship, and the problems between these ethnic populations date back to 
hundreds of years before the existence of modern nation-states. Following 
the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States in 1940, and throughout the 
Cold War, the Kremlin relocated hundreds of thousands of ethnic Rus-
sians to Estonia. The purpose behind these mass migrations was two-fold: 
to increase cohesion in the Eastern Bloc and to "Russify" Estonian cul-
ture. Following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the 
U.S.S.R., the government in Tallinn implemented policies designed to 
minimize Russian influences on Estonian culture.1, 2 And although Esto-
nia joined NATO in 2004 and received the Atlantic Alliance's Article 5 
mutual security guarantee, distrust of Moscow's intentions remains 
strong. After several years of lobbying, Estonia recently received NATO 
contingency plans to protect the country in the event of a hypothetical 
Russian invasion.3 There are also reports that the government has even 
created house-to-house defense plans against Russian aggression.4
The cyber attacks on Estonia occurred within the overall climate of 
tension between ethnic Estonians and the country's Russian minority 
population. On April 30, 2007, the government moved the Bronze 
Soldier—a memorial commemorating the Soviet liberation of Estonia 
from the Nazis—from Tõnismägi Park in central Tallinn to the Tallinn 
Military Cemetery. This decision sparked rioting among the Russian-
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speaking community, which comprised around 26 percent of Estonia's 
population in 2007.5 To ethnic Estonians, the Bronze Soldier symbolized 
Soviet oppression. But to Russian minorities, its relocation represented 
further marginalization of their ethnic identity. As Mary Kaldor and 
David Szakonyi argue,6, 7 a perceived attack on the identity of a 
subordinate group is likely to provoke a nationalist backlash, as occurred 
in Estonia. In addition to rioting and violence from April 27 to May 18, 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) cyber attacks targeting the country's 
infrastructure shut down the websites of all government ministries, two 
major banks, and several political parties. At one point, hackers even 
disabled the parliamentary email server.8 Estonian officials like Foreign 
Minister Urmas Paet quickly accused Russia of perpetrating the attacks, 
but European Commission and NATO technical experts were unable to 
find credible evidence of Kremlin participation in the DDoS strikes.9
Globalization and Electronic Resistance
Increased communication, networking, and reliance on digital 
infrastructure in the information age empower transnational resistance 
movements and create new vulnerabilities for nation-states. In the global 
Russian diaspora community, email and inexpensive international 
telephone services "create a shared immediacy and 'virtual' 
togetherness."10 When combined with satellite television, the wide 
availability of Russian-language publications, and a plethora of Internet 
forums, these elements of globalization have enabled the Russian ethnic 
identity to transcend geopolitical borders. During the cyber attacks on 
Estonia, Russian-language forums provided news updates and a 
recruiting ground for interested hackers. This indicates that—in addition 
to a shared identity—digital technology enables rapid transnational 
mobilization in times of crisis.
Alongside eased mobilization across the global Russian diaspora, Esto-
nia's dependency on information technology (IT) provided angry hackers 
with several appealing targets for DDoS attacks. Like most other western 
states, Estonia relies on the Internet for its critical infrastructure; elec-
tronic networks are integral to the functioning of government operations, 
electric power grids,11 banking services, and even Tallinn's water supply. 
In Estonia, 97 percent of bank transactions occur online; and in 2007, 60 
percent of the country's population used the Internet on a daily basis.12 
Further, Mihkel Tammet, the IT director at the Estonian Defense Minis-
try, explains that the Estonian state is so reliant on the Internet that its 
model of government operations is referred to as "paperless govern-
ment."13 The only Estonian bank to report its operating losses due to the 
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strikes estimated around $1 million in damages,14 and the attacks pre-
vented credit card and automatic teller machine transactions from occur-
ring for several days.15 Meanwhile, the hackers disabled the 
parliamentary email server and the IT capabilities of several government 
ministries, paralyzing the state's ability to effectively respond. During the 
crisis, former White House cyber-security advisor Howard Schmidt even 
went so far as to say, "Estonia has built their future on having a high-tech 
government and economy, and they've basically been brought to their 
knees because of these attacks."16
This type of transnational digital mobilization to exploit the vulnerabili-
ties of nation-states for political purposes exemplifies the emergent threat 
of cyber terrorism. James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies (CSIS) offers a clear definition of this phenomenon, noting 
that cyber terrorism "is the use of computer network tools to shut down 
critical national infrastructures (such as energy, transportation, and gov-
ernment operations) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian 
population."17 In the case of Estonia, the cyber-terrorist attacks occurred 
through the use of globally dispersed and virtually unattributable botnets 
of "zombie" computers. The hackers hijacked computers—including many 
home PCs—in places like Egypt, Russia, and the United States and used 
them in a "swarming" DDoS strategy. Government and bank websites that 
normally received 1,000 visits a day crashed after receiving upwards of 
2,000 hits a second.18 Estonian authorities made a few in-country arrests 
but never uncovered the main culprits, who were allegedly operating out 
of Russia.
While the cyber-terror attacks on Estonia shocked the international com-
munity, by most accounts, they could have been significantly more devas-
tating. In future assaults, hackers may target a state's traffic lights, water 
supply, power grids, air traffic controls, or even its military weapon sys-
tems. As the Estonian crisis indicates, the Internet has become a powerful 
asymmetric tool for transnational groups who view themselves as disen-
franchised and seek to intimidate the nation-states and other actors pre-
sumably responsible for their grievances. This is an issue of national 
sovereignty, as the digital networks and critical infrastructure targeted by 
the hackers are the property of—or on the territory of—nation-states.
Interstate or Transnational Threat?
Scholars, practitioners, and students of international security are well 
aware of the development of advanced cyber-warfare capabilities by states 
around the world like China, Israel, Russia, and the United States. The 
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rise of these capabilities and their attendant strategies has led many coun-
tries to include cyber attacks as an area of concern in their national secu-
rity doctrines. For instance, Washington lists violence in cyberspace as a 
threat alongside traditional terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, and transnational crime in its National Security Strat-
egy.19 Nonetheless, Douglas Thomas of the University of Southern Cali-
fornia contends that "99 percent of…hackers do not have the skill or the 
ability to organize or execute an attack that would be anything more than 
a minor inconvenience."20 Given Russia's advanced cyber-war capabili-
ties and the gravity of the attacks on Estonia, it is a legitimate question to 
ask if the attacks were truly executed by autonomous networks of Rus-
sian-speaking hackers or if they were committed or sponsored by the 
Kremlin.
Even though EU and NATO technical experts were unable to find evi-
dence of Russian involvement in the Estonian cyber-terror incident, it 
certainly would have been in Moscow's interests to organize DDoS strikes. 
After the movement of the Bronze Soldier and clashes between police and 
demonstrators, Russian officials accused Tallinn of human rights viola-
tions and demanded that Prime Minister Andrus Ansip apologize and 
resign from office.21 While Russia categorically denied any involvement in 
the attacks, one unnamed NATO official did not mince words: "I won't 
point fingers. But these were not things done by a few individuals. This 
clearly bore the hallmarks of something concerted."22 Because of eco-
nomic interdependence and the threat of nuclear escalation, Russia can-
not risk attacks on NATO member states,23 perhaps making 
unattributable cyber strikes an attractive alternative. In addition to the 
fact that NATO's conventional military forces significantly outnumber 
those of the Russian Federation,24 Estonia serves as a key transit country 
for Russian oil and natural gas supplies to Central and Western Europe. 
And for all the rhetoric about Russia's coercive energy politics, Moscow 
exports over 90 percent of its gas and oil to Europe,25 fostering a situation 
of mutual economic interdependence. A conventional Russian attack on 
Estonia would trigger a NATO Article 5 response and could compromise 
the energy wealth that has led to growing Russian influence on the inter-
national stage. In a world of deterrence and interdependence, virtually 
untraceable digital displays of force could allow states to subvert the con-
straints of the international system.
While we may never know the true extent of Kremlin involvement in the 
cyber attacks on Estonia, it is clear that Russian officials encouraged the 
hackers by accusing Tallinn of altering history, perpetrating human rights 
violations, and encouraging fascism.26 The Russian authorities also 
turned a blind eye as pro-Kremlin activists blockaded the Estonian 
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embassy in Moscow for several days.27 Although it would have served 
Russian national interests to test Moscow's cyber-war capabilities on 
Estonia, the general consensus among experts is that sophisticated "hack-
tivists" in Russia—and possibly throughout the global Russian diaspora—
perpetrated the attacks.28 The alarming reality of the situation is that, in 
the information age, computer-savvy individuals can now threaten the 
sovereignty and wellbeing of nation-states, oftentimes from the comfort 
of their own homes.
Multinational Responses to Cyber Terror
The 2007 cyber terrorism on Estonia was more than just a temporary nui-
sance; rather, it was a mild version of a new form of digital violence that 
could halt public services, commerce, and government operations. Esto-
nian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo observed that successful cyber 
attacks "can effectively be compared to when your ports are shut to the 
sea."29 A blockade is a fitting analogy, as future cyber-terrorist attacks 
may disrupt a country's water and electricity supplies, telecommunica-
tions (severing its connections to the world), and national defenses.
The seriousness of the attacks on Estonia generated a rapid international 
response. Estonia had few formal cyber-defense preparations outside of 
its framework for countering traditional acts of terrorism,30 and the gov-
ernment Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) required Finnish, 
German, Israeli, and Slovenian assistance to restore normal network 
operations.31 NATO CERTs provided additional assistance, while the EU's 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) offered 
expert technical assessments of the developing situation. Further, a high 
level of intelligence sharing took place among western countries during 
the crisis. While Russian-speaking hackers employed the Internet as a 
weapon and tool of mobilization, Estonia and its allies used digital net-
works to successfully counter the attacks.
During and after the DDoS strikes, NATO and EU member states began to 
debate new directions for cyber security and the appropriate punishments 
for states found to have engaged in digital warfare. Sanctions were one 
punishment option that received fairly widespread support. Additionally, 
one German official even recommended that NATO consider extending its 
Article 5 security guarantees to the realm of cyberspace.32 At its Buchar-
est Summit in April 2008, NATO adopted a unified Policy on Cyber 
Defence and created the Brussels-based Cyber Defence Management 
Authority (CDMA) to "centralise cyber defence operational capabilities 
across the Alliance."33 And in August 2008, Tallinn became home to the 
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NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE), the 
Atlantic Alliance's cyber-security headquarters. On the EU front, in 
November 2010, the organization released its Internal Security Strategy, 
which calls for integrated responses to cyber-security threats and signifi-
cant expansion of ENISA's duties beyond its previously limited analytical 
role.34
Beyond these efforts, throughout 2010 and in the early months of 2011, 
both organizations announced a series of concrete long-term plans aimed 
at countering cyber attacks. The EU's new Digital Agenda for Europe 
revealed plans to establish CERTs for EU institutions, hold multinational 
cyber-defense simulations, and create a joint European cyber-crime plat-
form.35 NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept in Lisbon in November 
2011, which indicated that the alliance will take steps to develop strong, 
integrated Internet defense capabilities.36 To that end, General Stéphane 
Abrial, head of NATO's Allied Command Transformation, has confirmed 
that the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability Technical Centre 
(NCIRC TC) in Mons, Belgium will become operational in 2012.37 These 
EU and NATO actions are indicative of the growing recognition of the 
severity of today's digital threats. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense 
William Lynn warned when discussing NATO vulnerabilities in light of 
the Estonian case, "The potential exists for capabilities that are much 
more destructive…We're largely in the exploitation/denial phase, but his-
tory will tell you that somebody will take it to the extreme."38
The multinational responses to the 2007 attacks on Estonia indicated that 
countries would not remain detached and complacent as states or non-
state actors threatened the sovereignty of their allies by using the Internet 
as a weapon. Still, it is important to note that the international response 
to the events in Estonia occurred within the confines of preexisting secu-
rity communities. Russia tolerated and encouraged the cyber attacks, and 
the Kremlin may have even colluded with the hackers responsible for the 
strikes. China addressed the matter as an internal Estonian security 
dilemma and eschewed involvement in the resultant international cyber-
security discussions. Regardless of any secret complicity or participation 
in the Estonian cyber attacks, Moscow and Beijing surely analyzed the sit-
uation, assessed Tallinn's vulnerabilities and western responses, and 
improved upon their own cyber-warfare capabilities and strategies as a 
result.
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Conclusion
The severity of the Estonian cyber attacks served as a wake-up call to the 
world, as it became clear that potentially autonomous transnational 
networks—like unhappy pro-Kremlin "hacktivists"—could avenge their 
grievances by digitally targeting and nearly crippling the critical 
infrastructure of technically sophisticated nation-states. In the future, an 
enhanced focus on cyber security and new multinational strategies and 
institutions will be instrumental in countering electronic threats to the 
sovereignty and survival of states. However, the world of information 
security is not unlike the traditional global security environment; for each 
visible action, there is oftentimes a commensurate reaction. The attacks 
on Estonia will likely encourage future groups of transnational imitators, 
and the events of spring 2007 have provided states with important 
information for the further development and improvement of their own 
cyber-warfare capabilities.
The benefits of the information age are numerous, but nascent threats like 
transnational cyber terrorism and information warfare exist alongside the 
positive aspects of globalization. In this period of IT-driven globalization, 
the attacks on Estonia demonstrate that even NATO Article 5 and U.S. 
nuclear umbrella guarantees cannot ensure the protection of a nation-
state's sovereignty in cyberspace. A new challenge has emerged for free 
societies: democracies must find ways to strike a balance between allow-
ing Internet freedom on one hand and maintaining adequate early warn-
ing and monitoring systems on the other. These systems, combined with 
expanded cyber-security cooperation across borders, will be integral in 
detecting suspicious digital activities and countering attempted acts of 
cyber warfare and cyber terrorism. Just as the world economy has 
adapted to the digital era, the Estonian cyber terrorism case indicates that 
the foreign and security policies of nation-states must also do so, as diffi-
cult-to-attribute asymmetric threats stemming from the Internet are 
likely to harm nation-states in the future.
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